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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JACQUELINE RICCIUTI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

JACK C. ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by Jacqueline Ricciuti,
plaintiff and respondent, for damages sustained in an
automobile accident which occurred on the 20th day of
December, 1952, in a residential section of Ogden, Utah.
The plaintiff was riding as a guest passentger in an
auton1obile operated by Jack C. Robinson, the defendant
and appellant herein. No other vehicle \vas involved.
The trial of the case in the District Court in and for
Weber County resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
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Appellant will contend herein that the evidence was
not sufficient as a matter of law to go to the jury on the
issue of "wilful misconduct." Appellant will further contend that the court erred in its instructions to the jury
in that an instruction was given relating to simple negligence in this, a guest-pasenger case.
STATMENT OF· FA errs
Mrs. Ricciuti, at the time of this accident, resided
at the Ben Lomond Hotel in Ogden, Utah. On the evening
of the accident she had no specific plans and had "washed
some things out and fell asleep." Before 10 :00 o'clock
p.m. she had awakened, dressed and gone to the "Combo,"
which is a tavern a few doors south of the Ben Lomond
Hotel on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. While
there, she had a bottle of beer and talked for some time
to the bartender. Plaintiff left the "Combo" intending
to go to the "Washiki Club." She met Mary Johnson
(also a passenger in the R,obinson vehicle at the tilne of
the accident) in front of the "Washiki Club" and at the
invitation of Miss Johnson, both 'vent to the "Hi-Hat"
club in Roy, Utah, acco1npanied by a gentleman friend
of Miss Johnson in his automobile. They arrived at the
"Hi-Hat" about 5 minutes past 12 :00 midnight. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff was introduced to Mr. Robinson (the
defendant) and a 1\.fr. Carnan and a _j[r. Toponc~. There
were no tables at the •'Hi-Hat," so the 3 1nen invited
plain tiff and l\{iss Johnson to accon1 pany the1n back to
Ogden, and they went to the '•Double-B" on Wall Avenue
and 19th Street in that city. "\Vhen the group arrived at
the "Double-B", Mr. Carnan took l\Ir. Toponce home

')
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and returned to the cafe. 'l'hey stayed at the "DoubleB" until after 3 :00 a.m., whereupon the 2 couples left in
Mr. Robinson's automobile and headed for Pineview
Dam. Mr. Robinson and Miss Johnson were in the front
seat; the plaintiff and J.\ifr. Carnan in the back seat. The
weather, when they left the city, was clear, but it commenced to snow lightly at Pineview Dam. The roadway,
however, was not slick, merely wet. On the return trip
to the city, while the automobile 'vas traveling in the
vicinity of 23rd Street and Harrison Boulevard, the
defendant dropped a lighted cigarette in the folds of his
topcoat and lost control of the automobile, which jumped
the curb and traveled for some distance on the parking;
then returned to the street. Plaintiff was thrown from
the car and rendered temporarily unconscious. Shortly,
thereafter, she was taken to the Dee Hospital by ambulance.
The above is a recitation of the facts in brief.
Specific testimony relating to the facts will be gone into
under the points of argument.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A
VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LEROY G.
BENNETT'S TESTIMONY OVER THE OBJECTION OF
COUNSEL.
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 16.

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A
VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE
PLAINTIFF AT THE CLOSE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE.

Plaintiff introduced testimony from three \vitnesses
relating to the facts pertinent to the happening of the
accident. Mrs. Riccuiti testified in her own behalf, stating that no alcoholic beverage had been consumed by any
of the parties from the time they met until the time of the
accident. She noticed nothing unusual about the way the
fellows acted, and stated further that they were not
under the influence of intoxicants when she met them (R.
18). In view of that testimony, intoxication 1nust, of
course, be ruled out as an element in this guest-passenger
case.
As to the conduct and acts of the defendant in
operating his vehicle, the plaintiff, Mrs. Riccuiti, had
this to say: (R. 20)

"Q.

How: did he drive do\vn the canyon towards
Ogden~

A.

lie was driving very carefully.

Q.

Tlien as I understand it, your first intinlation or first kno\vledge of this accident was
\vhen you suddenly felt the car joshling
a.round. Is that right"?

A.

That's right.

Q.

You had no con1plaint or no concern about
the 1nanner in which .l\fr. R.obinson was driving the car before tl1is joshling suddenly

. . . . . ...
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occurred and the accident happened.
A.

That's right. I didn't think he was doing anything wrong."

Testifying further, she stated that later that morning at the hospital in the presence of herself and Miss
Johnson, the defendant stated that Mary Johnson was
asleep in the front seat with her head in his lap, and
that he dropped a lighted cigarette in his lap·, and lost
control of the car (R. 8).
Sergeant LeRoy G. Bennett of the Ogden City Police
F·orce called as a witness on behalf of plaintiff testified
that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 4 :00
a.m. and at that time, conducted an investigation (R. 34).
Harrison Boulevard in the vicinity of 23rd Street is
a residential area. There is a parking betvveen the sidewalk and the street which is planted in grass and has a
row of trees along it. Sergeant Bennett determined that
the path the vehicle took was visible on the parking, and
that the tracks could be seen on the grass under the
light snow which had just cornmenced to fall. Using
plaintiff's Exhibit "A" for illustration, he traced the
path of the vehicle from the street onto the parking and
back onto the street. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" is reproduced in this brief for purposes of illustration). He
determined that the vehicle left the roadway and ju1nped
the curb in front of resident No. 2335 (Exhibit "A"),
crossed the driveway between resident No. 2335 and 2341
and that the right rear fender and lnunper ~truck a tree
on the parking in front of residence No. 2;~41. The car
continued on, and the right rear door 'va~ torn free fro1n
5
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the vehicle as it struck a tree in front of residence No.
2345. The vehicle continued, and returned to the roadway
between residences 2353 and 2359. Mrs. Riccuiti and
Mr. Carnan, the passengers in the back seat of the auto~
mobile, were thrown from it in front of residence No.
2353, · and the positions in which they were found are
n1arked with an X on plaintiff's Exhibit "A". The offi~
cer determined that the vehicle had traveled 192 feet
on the curbing. When he carne upon the scene, the
vehicle was parked on the street in front of the driveway separating residences 2359 and 2361. He had been
told that the vehicle had been backed up from the point
where it had come to rest, and determined that it had
been backed up 174 feet. He concluded that the vehicle
had traveled a distance of 373 feet from the time it left
the roadway until the time it came to rest (R. 34, 35, 36,
37, 38). After describing the path the vehicle took, and
pointing out the two trees which had been struck, and
the distances involved, Sergeant Bennett was asked by
plaintiff's counsel if he had an opinion as to how fast
the vehicle 'vas traveling at the ti1ne it jumped the curb.
Over objection of eounsel, the court pern1i tted the officer
to state his opinion. He said the vehicle was traveling 60
miles per hour (R. 40). (That the court erred in allowing this conclusion, is the subject of argu1nent under
Point II of this Brief.)
As part of Sergeant Bennett's investigation, he
asked the defendant what caused the. rar t,o go out of
control and on the parking. He testified that defendant
t.old hin1 that l\lary Johnson \Ya~ asleep 'vith her head
6
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1n his lap, and that he dropped a cigarette in his lap
and looked down for it, and the next thing he knew, the
car was bumping over the driveway. The officer also
stated that the defendant told hi1n that he was traveling
40 miles per hour just before the accident.
Officer Verne B. Lundgren of the Ogden City Police
Force also testified on behalf of p~aintiff, but his testimony is largely repetitious, and added nothing to that
already testified to by Sargeant Bennett.
The above testimony, in substance, is the facts upon
which the plaintiff relies to support her clain1 for damages under the Utah Guest Statute.
Jack C. Robinson, in his own behalf, testified to the
following facts in regard to the happening of the accident: (R. 80)
"A. And then what happened as you drove on
down onto Harrison Avenue~ Just tell the
court and jury in your own words and speak
loud enough so they can hear you. Just tell
them 'vhat happened and what you did~

A.

I drove on down until I got to Harrison
Boulevard and turned south and I got down
to, well, just past 23rd and was about the middle of the block, I dropped the cigarette down
in the folds of my top coat.

Q.

Now, where a bouts did that cigarette lite. If
you remember'

A.

Right in the middle of my lap.

Q.

Did you have a top coat on at that time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did yon do v1hen you dropped that
cigarette·~
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A.

Tried to pick it up at first and couldn't get
hold of it. I brushed at it and sparks flew.
I looked down just a se0ond to see where it
went and the next thing I hit the curb and it
spun the wheel out of my hands.

Q. What did you do after the wheel spun out of
your
then~

A.

hands~

Do you recall what happened
As near as you can recall~

I fought the car back. It was heading back
to,vards the trees. I fought to get back
tovvard the road there. I seen the front door
come open and Mary started to slide out. I
reached with one hand to hold 4er and when
I got back on the road, I stopped to see how
the rest of them was hurt. They were over
on the parkvvay and I backed up to where
they were."

He stated that he had a conservation with the officers after the accident, but said that at no time did he
say that Mary J·ohnson was asleep 'vith her head in his
lap. As to the speed of the automobile he told the officers he was traveling between 35 and 40 mph. (R. 83).
Mary Johnson, testified that she wa.s sitting next
to defendant and that she was at his side when she went
·to sleep and didn't remember after she fell asleep
whether or not her head was on his shoulder (R. 89).
She was present at the time :Thfr. Robinson was interrogated by the officers :;tnd, to her knowledge, defendant
did not say that she was laying with her head in his lap.
When the evidence as to facts of the accident presented by both sides is examined, they show simply a
driver of an automobile dropping a lighted cigarette into

8
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the folds of his clothing, and in his atte1npt to locate
the burning object, losing control of the auton1obile. Up
to that point the vehicle was operated in a careful and
prudent manner. There was no apprehension of danger
and certainly nothing to be apprehensive about. That
fact is uncontroverted. All parties concerned testified
that the manner of operation of the vehicle was careful
The only conflict in the testi1nony was lVIiss Johnson's position in the front seat. However, whether she
was laying with her head in defendant's lap as contended
by plaintiff, or whether she was asleep next to defendant, is immaterial, because obviously it had no effect on
defendant's manner of operation. And too, he would
be equally concerned with dropping a lighted cigarette
in the folds of his own clothing or on the clothing of
someone else. The only act, then, which can possibly be
construed to give rise to liability on the part of defendant, is the dropping of a lighted cigarette, and that act
can amount to no more than an act of momentary inadvertence or inattention. That such act on the part of
a motor vehicle operator could be construed to be negligence is perhaps true, but it is equally true that such an
act cannot be 'vilful misconduct under the Utah Guest
statute as that term is ordinarily understood and defined.
U.C.A., 1953, 49-9-1:
". . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving the ovvner, or driver, or person
responsible for the operation of a vehicle from
liability for injury to, or death of, such guest
proximately resulting from the intoxication or
wilful misconduct of sueh o'vner, driver or person
y
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responsible for the operation of such vehicle .... "
In Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P. 2d 594, (Utah), this court
with apparent approval of the lower court's instructions
defined the term "Wilful misconduct" as follows:
''th·e intentional doing of an act or intentional
omitting or failing to do an act, with knowledge
that serious injury is a probably and not merely
a possible result, or the intentional doing of an
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the
possible consequences."
The authorities are in accord with that definition.
See Blashfield's' Cyclopedia of Autom-obile Law, Vol. 4,
Sec. 2322.
"Willful misconduct is the intentional doing
of s·omething which should not be done, or intentional failure to do something which should be
done, in the operation of the automobile, under
cir~umstances tending to disclose the operator's
knowledge, express or implied, that an injury to
the guest will be a probable result of such conduet." S.ee also 60 C.J.S. 1001.
Clearly an act of n1omentary inadvertence is not contemplated within the definition of "wilful misconduct"
because such an act is not characterized by the kn au· ledge
that doing the act will result in probable serious injury.
In the cases cited below it vvill be sho,vn that courts in
various jurisdictions have dealt "\Vith the proble1n accordingly.
Neyens v. Gehl, 15 N.W. 2d 888, (Iovva)
This action \vas by a guest against his host for
injuries sustained in an ~uton1obile accident. There vvere
five passengers in the vehicle. Just before the accident,

10
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the defendant requested plaintiff ('vho was in the back
seat) to light and hand him a cigarette. The cigarette
was passed to the girl who was sitting in the front seat
and dropped by the defendant driver when handed to
hin1. He momentarily took his eyes frorn the road while
reaching for the cigarette, and the vehicle struck a bridge
abutment and overturned. There was a dispute in the
evidence as to how fast the vehicle \vas traveling. The
jury could have found that the vehicle was traveling up
to 60 mph. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant. Plaintiff n1oved for a new trial on the ground
that the court erred in its ruling certain of plaintiff's
evidence and also erred in its instructions. ·The lower
court ruled that the motion of the defendant for a
directed verdict should have been granted and, therefore,
stated that the other alleged errors need not be considered. Plaintiff appealed.
The court held :
"The court's holding that, if the defendants'
n1otion for directed verdict should have been sustained, any error in the instructions \Vould be
without prejudice, was clearly sound. (Citing
cases). We are also of the opinion and hold that
the court was right in its final detern1ination that
defendants' motion for a directed verdict should
have been sustained ....
"In Harvey v. Clark, 2:-32 J owa 729, 732, 6 N.W.
2d 144, we held that failure to see a train in ti1ne
to avoid colliding \v1th it at a c-rossing did not
constitute recklessness, stating as follows:
"'~ro constitute reckle;~;~;ness under the guest
statute, conduct rnu~t he rnore than negligent and
must manifest a heedless disregard for or jndiflJ
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ference to the consequences or the rights or safety
of others. It need not involve n1oral turpitude nor
wanton and willful C{)nduct. (citing cases). We
have frequently said that conduct arising fron1
n1ere inadverence, thoughtlessness, or error of
judgment is not reckless.'
"In the case of Wilson v. Oxborro,v, 220 Iowa
1135, 265 N.W. 1, we held that a driver, who
approached a bridge around a ten degree curve
a-straddle the black lines in the center of the pavement at 40 miles per hour, confining his view to
the black lines so that he did not see an approaching truck until 75 feet therefrom and thereupon
swerved to ther right side-swiping the truck, resulting in fatal injuries to a guest, was not reckless. In the case of Shenkle v. Mains, 216 Iowa
1324, 24 7 N.vV. 635, the driver failed to observe
an approaching car in time to avoid side-swiping
it, resulting in fatal injuries to a guest and we
also held that a case of recklessness had not been
made out. In Roberts v. Koons, 230 Iowa 92, 296
N. vV. 811, the driver failed to observe a parked
truck while driving through sno'v flurries, collided with it, resulting in fatal injury to a guest
and we held it as recklessness had not been shown.
In Tomasek v. Lynch, 233 Iowa 662, 10 N.W. 2d
3, a driver failed to recognize a "T" intersection
in time to avoid driving into the ditch and we
reversed the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict on the ground that recklessness had not been
shown.
"In all of the cases above cited there was
some inadvertence, thoughtlessness or error in
judgrnent, 'vhirh 'vould prohably support a claim
of actionable negligence but the evidence failed
.
'
to sho'v
heedles~ disregard for or indifference to
the eonequences or right or safety of others. So

12
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it is here. \Ve find no decision of this court that
seems t·o be directly analgous. Decisions from
other courts, however, definitely support our
position."
Ringe v. Holbrook, 149 A. 231, (Conn.)
Plaintiff \vas riding as a guest 111 an automobile
operated by the defendant, sitting next to the defendant.
The automobile was traveling the road at a high speed,
but at a speed 'vhich the court deen1ed not excessive
under the circun1stances. Both plaintiff and defendant
testified that while so traveling the presence of a bee
was noticed in the front seat. Defendant momentarily
took her right hand off the wheel to reach for the bee and
at that moment the aut~omobile left the road and struck
a fence, causing plaintiff's injuries. The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff which was set aside by the
lo\ver court on motion of the defendant. Plaintiff
appealed from that order.
Court held: "The whole evidence shows beyond doubt that the accident \Vas due to the fact
that the attention of the defendant was momentarily distracted fron1 the operation of the car
because of a not unnatural reaction to the presence of the bee near or on her person. The trial
court was right in concluding that the situation
could not reasonably be held to disclose a reckless and heedless disregard by the defendant of
the rights of the plaintiff, within the ter1ns of our
statute restricting the right of recovery by a guest
in an automobile."
Bashor 'li. Bashor et al., 85 TT. 2d 732, (Colo.)

The vehicle in this case rontained a radio dial \\'"hich
'vas attached to the st~ering post. \\Thile proreeding
l '),)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

along an oiled high,vay at a speed .of about -!5 to 55 1nph
the defendant withdrew his attention from the road and
was engaged in dialing a station on this radio. His attention was directed to dailing the radio for so long a ti1ne
that his vehicle overtook a slower moving vehicle. When
his attention was called to this fact by a passt;nger he
'
was unable to bring his car under control and it veered
to the left and overturned. This action was brought by
a guest in the automobile under the Colorado Guebt
Statute which provides in substance that a guest may
not recover fron1 his host unless the host be guilty of
intoxication or "negligence consisting of wilful and
wanton disregard of the rights of others." The plaintiff
received a. verdict below and defendant appeals from the
refusal of the trial- court to grant his motion for a
directed verdict. ·
Court Held: "We think the evidence clearly
is sufficient to support a finding of negligence;
but unless the foregoing written statement is evidence of 'a wilful and wanton disregard of the
rights of others,' there is no such evidence in the
record. The driver was a close friend and relative
of the deceased. He was on friendly terms with
all the occupants of his car. No protest "\Vas made
by any one as to the speed or n1anner in vvhich
he 'vas driving. There is no evidence that any one
of .the passengers felt any apprehension o.f danger. There is no evidence that defendant willfully
wi thdre"r his attention fron1 the road ...... Out of
such a situation "'e are unable to spell \villfulness either of act or 01nission. ~I ere unconscious
inattention, under the circurnstances disclosed
here, and up to the 1110111ent of .the 'varning by
the passenger in the front seat-and nothing more
'

1·!
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is shown by the evidence-is not an omission of
such character as to justify a finding that one
could be guilty of such inattention and at the same
time have a natural and normal concern for the
safety of others who might be harmed as a result
of it. In other words, it is not wanton." Reversed.
I~o·u·e

Q!1b

v. Vander Kolk,J?Jt!f N.\V. 788, (Mich.)
About 9 :30 o'clock p.rn., while driving within the
li1nits of a city on a highway that was lighted, defendant
was attempting to defrost his windshield by placing the
pahn of his hand upon it when he suddenly can1e upon
a slow moving truck and trailer, vv-hich was properly
lighted. He did not see the truck until he was within 15
feet of it, an dsince he "\vas traveling about 40 miles per
hour, he was unable to avoid a collision although he
applied the brakes at once. Plaintiff, who was asleep in
the front seat beside the defendant, was injured. The
trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the
grounds that there was no evidence of defendant's gross
negligence or wanton or wilful misconduct and therefore
recovery was barred under the provisions of the guest
statute. This was affirmed by the Suprerne Court.
At the close of all the evidence, and after both sides
had rested, the defendant moved the court to direct a
verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff (R.
p. 100) on the grounds and for the reasons that the plaintiff had not sustained her burden of proving that the
defendant was guilty of "\vilful ruisconduct. What she
may have succeeded in proving \vas that defendant was
guilty of an act of momentary inadvertence \Vhich rnight
be negligent, but did not an1onnt to wulful rnisconduct.

lG
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Nothing more is shown. In view of that fact and the
authorities cited above, it is clear that the lower court
should have granted the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LEROY G.
BENNETT'S TESTIMONY OVER THE OBJECTION OF
COUNSEL.

LeRoy Bennett, police officer in Ogden, Utah, inves~
tigated this accident. The objectionable portion of his
testimony is set forth below.

"Q.

Sergeant Bennett, can you give us some
opinion as to the speed the car might have
been traveling under the circumstances'

~IR.

HANSON: If your honor please, we also
object to that as calling for a conclusion. I
don't think the sergeant could tell that.

THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You
can determine fro1n your cross examination.
You may answer.
A.

Do you want my opinion, or do you want what
I was told~

Q. Your opinion~
THE COURT: Your opinion.
Q.

Now, Sergeant Bennett-.

THE COlJRT:
(Interposing) Now, just a
mo1nen t. \..,. ou asked hin1 for an opinion.
J\.

l\lr opinion would be that the car was travel-

ing around 60 miles per hour.
In his testi1uony, he gaYe a detailed outline of the
physical facts \vhieh he found. '1_1his testimony is sum-

lG
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rnarized under !>oint I of this argu1nent and will not be
repeated here. It will suffice to say that the jury was
adequately informed of the path of the vehicle, the distance involved, the objects struck, the "\Veather conditions,
the nature of the ground over which the vehicle travelled
and the results of his interrogation. The conclusion he
gave as to the speed of the vehicle was clearly unwarranted. F'rom what appears in the record the jury was
as capable as the officer in deterrnining the speed of this
vehicle under the circumstances of this case and the
opinion given was an unwarranted invasion of the province of the jury.
It is true, of course, as general principle of law that
opinion evidence is allo,ved by experts in matters which
are technical and where the opinion will aid the jury in
its determination of the ultimate question. And, the
courts generally allow law enforcement officers to state
their opinion as to the speed of vehicles based on the
brake marks found at the scene of an accident. There is
authority for allowing this type of opinion evidence.
23 ALR 2d 112. But it is clear that the factors used in
deter1nining speed from brake marks remain relatively
constant and the average law enforcement officer is able
to familiarize himself with existing studies of road surfaces and braking distances wjthout having any special
training in this field. It must he borne in mind however,
that these studies used by enforcement officers are based
on factors such as road surfaces, reaction tirne in the
average individual, and coefficient of friction in different
weather conditions which rP1nain relatively constant and
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are compiled by experts in the field.
In the case at bar, the automobile traveled on a
parkway lined with trees, planted in lawn and interspersed with driveways into the various residences. It
was also found that the automobile had sideswiped two
trees and it is not shown whether the vehicle was being
braked after it left the parkway and reentered the highway or whether it was rolling free. The surface of the
parking was shown to be wet which would, of course,
materially reduce the coefficient friction. It is to be
noted at this point that the factors in this situation are
not constant but are unique to this case.
Furthermore, the officer was not shown to possess
any special qualifications in this field other than the
fact that he has investigated numerous accidents. No
experiments were made with this vehicle by the officer
and indeed it would be impossible for him to experiment
because the circumstances of this accident could never
be duplicated.
In view of the fact that the officer did not possess
the qualifications necessary to n1ake this opinion and
the further fact that the circumstances under which this
accident happened can in no way be related to any
accepted study of speeds in relations to brake marks,
road surfaces and reaction tin1e, it must therefore be concluded that a proper foundation was not laid for the
opinion and it was error to ad1nit it.
That the error 'vas prejudicial is readily seen. The
speed at which an auto1nobile is being operated is one of
the vital factors which go into tl1e determination of
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whether the vehicle is being operated with due regard to
the rights of others. An opinion given by a law enforcement officer who vvould normally be a distinterested
witness would be given more vveight by the jury than
,vould the testimony of the defendant. In the jury's
deliberation on the evidence presented this one element
could.have been a deciding factor and as has been noted,
it is a material factor.
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, AND PARTICULARLY INTI-IE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 16.

Included a1nong the court's instructions to the jury
is Instruction No. 16, which is set forth in full below:
"No. 16
In order to assist you in determining this
case, _the following definitions and explanations
are g1ven:
A) Whenever in my instructions I state that
the burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon a
certain party to prove a certain allegation made
by him, the meaning of such an instruction is this :
That unless the truth of that allegation is proved
by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall find
the same to be not true.
B) The term "preponderance of evidence,"
means such evidence as, when weighed with that
opposed to it, has 1nore convincing force, and
from which it results that the greater probability
of truth lies therein.
C) The proxirnate cause of an injury is that
cause which in natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by any efficient intervening rause:
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produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause,
the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It Inay operate
directly or through intern1ediate agencies or
through conditions created by such agencies.
D) Negligence is the doing of some act which
a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the
failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do, actuated by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs. It is the failure to use ordinary
care in the mange1nen t of one's property or person.
Negligence is not an absolute ter1n, but a
relative one; by this we mean that in deciding
whether there was negligence (wilful misconduct)* in this case the conduct in question must be
considered in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances, as sho,vn by the evidence. This
rule rests on the self-evident fact that a reasonably prudent person 'vill react differently to different circumstances. Those circumstances enter
in to and, in a sense, are a part of the conduct in
question. An act negligent under one set of conditions n1ight not be so under another. Therefore, to arrive a.t a fair standard, 've ask: "VVhat
conduct miglit reasonably have been expected of
a person of ordinary prudence under the same
criterion by 'v-hich to detern1ine whether or not
the evidence before us proves negligence.
E) Inasmuch as the a1nount of caution used
by the ordinarily prudent person varies in dire~t
porportion to the danger known to be involved 1n
his undertaking, it follo,vs that in the exercise of

* The words "wilful misconduct" were entered

by interlineation

by judge.
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ordinary care the an1ount of caution required \Vill
vary in accordance with the nature of the act and
the surrounding circun1stances. To put the matter
in another way, the an1ount of caution required
by the law increases as does the danger that reasonably should be apprehended.
F) ''Ordinary care" is that degree of care
\Vhich a reasonably pruden person would use
under the same or similar circumstances. Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight as under all the circumstances of the particular case would be exercised by a reasonably prudent, careful person.
G) The law does not mean that it seeks and
recognizes only one proxirnate cause of an injury,
consisting of only one factor, one act, one element
of circumstances, or the conduct of only one person. To the contrary, the acts and omissions of
two or more persons may work concurrently as
the efficient causes of an injury, and in such a
case, each of the participating acts or omissions
is regarded in law as a proximate cause."
It is at once clear, upon reading the foregoing instruction, tliat the legal terms therein explained pertain
to a simple negligence action, and cannot by any method
of legal logic or subtlety of argument have application to
the case at bar. The concept of ordinarily negligence and
\vilful misconduct connote standards of care which differ
not only in degree, but also are distinguished by the state
of mind or knowledge of the actor. By instructing the
jury on the legal definition applicahle to the negligent
acts of one guilty of a tort, the court entirely ignored the
concept of wilful misconduct, and thPreby delirnited and
foreclosed in the 1ninds of the jury th~ necessary legal
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elements of the case.
This instruction was duly excepted to by the defendant (R. p. 10'3).
And, too, the instant error effects the basic and sole
issue in this case; namely, the legal duty owned to plaintiff by defendant. The materiality of that issue is clear.
That an erroneous instruction concerning that issue is
prejudicial to the defendant, is likewise clear. We are
not unmindful of the fact that the trial. court in other
instructions alluded to the doctrine of wilful misconduct.
Whether those instructions correctly state the law need
not be determined, because this court has long held the
view that instructions which are contradictory or conflicting are prejudicially erroneous if they effect a material .......
issue in the case, and this rule obtains even if the law is
correctly stated at one point in the instructions; and the
defeat is not cured by an instruction requiring the jury
to view the instructions as a whole.
In the early case of Konold vs. Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., 60 Pac. 1021 (Utah), this court adopted the
following rule in regard to inconsistent instructions:
"Instructions on a 1naterial point in a case
which are inconsistent or contradictory should not
be given. The giving of such instructions is e:r~r
and a sufficient ground for reversal because 1t 1s
in1possible after the verdict to ascertain which
' the jury follo,ved' or 'vhat Influence
.
instructions
the erroneous instruction had in their deliberation. This has been so uniforn1ly held that citations a.re unnecessary."
Jensen v. [ltaJ~ Ry Co., 2·70 Pac. 349 (l-:-tah). This
\Vas an action for injuries sustained by a child of tender
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years against the railroad for the negligence of its train
operatives. At the close of evidence, plaintiff requested
instructions to the effect that the train operatives had
a duty to observe and avoid injuries to persons in the
vicinity of the tracks, which instructions were given.
Defendant, on the other hand, requested instruction to
the effect that the defendant was not required to anticipate the presence of and owed no duty until actual discovery, vvhich instructions vvere likewise given. "_l1he trial
below resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The court
held in substance that the instructions were conflicting
and that a nevv trial was ordered for this and other
reasons.
State v. Hendricks, 259 P. 2d, 452 (Utah). This was
a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. The instructions of the trial court at the close of the evidence tended
to shift the burden upon the defendant to show his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held:
"The fact that elsewhere in the instruction
the jury were correctly instructed on the presumption of innocence does not cure the instant
error. Although the instructions are to be considered as a whole, where they are in irreconcilable conflict, they could but mislead or confuse the
jury."
The conviction reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
The facts in this action do not show wilful rnisconduct
on the part of the defendant. The evidence in its entirety,
and -all the inferences to be gained therefrorn, vie,ved in
23.
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a light most favorable to the plaintiff, sho\v a vehicle
being operated in a careful and prudent manner up to a
point where defendant inadvertently dropped a lighted
cigarette. Reasonable minds, under those facts, could
reach but on conclusion, and that is that the ele1nent of
wilful misconduct (The intentional doing of an act, or
intentional omission, or failing to do an act, with knowledge that serious injury is a probable, and not merely
a possible result; or the intentional doing of an act with
wan ton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences), is absent from this case. The lower court,
therefore, erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff pursuant to defendant's
motion at the close of all the evidence.
Defendant contends that the only reasonable decision of this factual situation necessitates a reversal of
the trial court, with instructions to enter a verdict for
the defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of
action. However, in the event the court disagrees with
the reasoning herein eontained under Point I of this
brief, defendant urges the court to grant a new trial in
this rna tter on the grounds that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the la\v applicable to the evidence. Under the instructions, the jury
was at liherty· to find that the duty o'vned to the plaintiff
by the defendant 'Yas to avoid acts of sin1ple negligence,
and this clearly 'vas prejudicial error justifying the
granting of a ne'v trial.
R,espectfully subn1itted,
srrElV-1\RT, c:ANNON & IIANSON,
.A ttornr~lJS for .llppellant.
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